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Normative law and economics remains controversial decades after its 
emergence despite its successes in legal scholarship and its similarity to in-
fluential approaches in economics. The reason is that many of its propo-
nents have exaggerated its value for policy while discounting other meth-
ods, tainting the enterprise. Normative law and economics as a method of 
policy analysis properly operates within narrow boundaries defined by its 
four main premises: (1) welfarism based on unrestricted preferences; (2) 
unimportance of distributional effects; (3) unimportance of impacts on 
non-welfare values; and (4) rational instrumental behavior of affected per-
sons. Scholars have made progress in normative law and economics by ab-
stracting away from these premises. The most successful work proposes 
“modular” insights at a middle level of abstraction. But this work can be 
properly put to use only if the excluded factors are reintroduced into anal-
ysis prior to application. 
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Introduction 
Normative law and economics (NLE) has long faced a paradox. Many 
of its prescriptions are useful, and the literature is dominant in various ar-
eas of law. But the approach remains controversial within law schools. The 
likely reason for this paradox is that advocates for NLE have exaggerated 
its value for policy, and made controversial normative and empirical claims 
on its behalf. Justified skepticism about these claims, and ensuing debates, 
have tainted the enterprise.1 In this brief Essay, I suggest a modest ap-
proach to NLE that preserves its value as an academic project and avoids 
reliance on controversial normative or empirical assumptions. 
My argument is that the various efforts to offer a comprehensive eco-
nomic approach to evaluating the law and legal reforms should be aban-
doned. I argue that a legal analyst cannot avoid the complicated, and often 
apparently contradictory, moral questions that surround legal reform by 
stipulating that a single welfarist criterion will be used for evaluating legal 
reforms. Yet NLE can play a useful role by helping analysts identify supe-
rior means for achieving a given goal in settings that are abstracted away 
from moral, practical, and political questions that will nonetheless have to 
be answered before a policy is implemented. I call this type of analysis 
modular—because the results, once established, can be plugged into dif-
ferent policy contexts. The usefulness of the exercise derives from its reli-
ance on mid-level abstraction, which avoids the controversies that sur-
round both concrete policy proposals that produce identifiable winners 
and losers, and highly abstract debates about moral theory. Where NLE-
inspired analysts seek to make a more direct impact on public policy, they 
should address the non-efficiency-related moral and policy issues. 
I make this argument by describing four broad premises of NLE, as it 
is standardly practiced: (1) welfarism, (2) absence of negative distributive 
effects, (3) absence of harm to non-welfarist principles, and (4) accuracy of 
behavioral premises.2 Or one can think of these premises as the limits or 
conditions of the scope in which NLE can make unqualified policy recom-
mendations. NLE scholars should (if they do not already) recognize that 
these premises are highly contestable, and in each case limit the scope in 
which NLE can be useful. And because these premises are contestable, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 1. Earlier debates about whether law and economics advances a conservative political 
agenda petered out because, I suspect, many scholars in the field were self-identified liberals and 
made liberal or left-wing arguments using economic analysis. But the damage has been done. “Law 
and economics” is emerging in popular discussion as a metonymy for right-wing propaganda 
funded by plutocrats. See, e.g., KURT ANDERSEN, EVIL GENIUSES: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICA 
134-35 (2020); JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES 
BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT 130-34 (2016). In response to this onslaught, people 
who remain committed to law and economics might give thought to how they can shore up their 
research agenda. 
 2. Premises (1) to (3) can be thought of as “weak welfarism.” See MATTHEW D. ADLER 
& ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 53 (2006). 
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people can reasonably disagree as to the scope of NLE’s utility. I then sug-
gest that while NLE can avoid some of these pitfalls by keeping the analysis 
general, its usefulness depends on whether the mid-level analysis can ulti-
mately be brought to bear on real-world problems. 
I. Conditions for NLE 
A. Welfare 
NLE is generally thought to assume welfarism, the view that the well-
being of individuals is morally important. This assumption might seem 
harmless but in fact could have strangled NLE in its crib. The reason is that 
NLE, like much of normative economics, uses the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
criterion or the Pareto criterion. Most welfarists believe in the diminishing 
marginal utility of money, which implies that in any society with wealth 
disparities, the government should redistribute wealth from rich to poor. 
But both the Pareto criterion and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion block redis-
tributions of wealth. Any transfer makes a party worse off (in violation of 
the Pareto criterion) or produces a winner who cannot overcompensate the 
loser from her winnings (in violation of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion).3 
As I will discuss in Section I.B., the problem was not solved but 
avoided through a division-of-labor policy strategy. NLE would be permit-
ted to make efficiency arguments because distributional issues would be 
addressed by the tax-and-transfer arm of the government. But this still left 
the question of what exactly we mean by welfare, and whether the effi-
ciency criteria maximize it. That question I will address first. 
Among philosophers, there are three major positions about the mean-
ing of welfare. First, well-being can be understood as a mental state char-
acterized by pleasure or the absence of pain. Bentham understood utility 
in this way. While this view fell out of favor for many decades, in recent 
years it has been resurrected by economists who use surveys to measure 
what they call subjective utility, and has influenced legal scholars and pol-
icymakers as well.4 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 3. The 1970s debate over NLE seems to have petered out over this conundrum. See, for 
example, Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980); especially 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 591 (1980); and Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Everyone Expect a 
Bigger Slice?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671 (1980). 
 4. See, e.g., JOHN BRONSTEEN, CHRISTOPHER BUCCAFUSCO & JONATHAN S. MASUR, 
HAPPINESS AND THE LAW (2015). 
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Second, well-being can be understood in objective terms—to refer to 
capacities, actions, or states of being like receiving adequate nutrition, en-
joying family life, receiving intellectual stimulation, and the like.5 Objec-
tive-good accounts have played a role in the development of international 
indicators for quality of life across countries. 
Third, well-being can be understood in terms of choice or preference 
(or desire). People do well when they make choices for themselves within 
their budget constraints. This is the standard view in economics, which as-
sumes that when a person makes a choice, her well-being (“utility”) in-
creases relative to the alternative. While some philosophers connect well-
being to choice, they require preferences (they usually use the term de-
sires) to be well-informed and undistorted by social conditions—for exam-
ple, an addict’s choice to take drugs does not necessarily enhance her well-
being.6 
NLE nearly always relies on the economic definition of utility, which 
virtually all philosophers reject. This is a source of considerable skepticism 
in law schools and elsewhere about the prescriptions of NLE. 
Consider, for example, debates about taxes or prohibitions on goods 
or services that may be bad for people—sugary foods, addictive drugs, por-
nography, and so on. Under the unrestricted preference view used by NLE, 
the debate is simply bizarre. A tax on sugary foods reduces welfare by re-
directing consumption from a desired good to a less desired good. Under 
any of the philosophically mainstream views of welfare, the debate is com-
prehensible, and in fact difficult. One might believe that people should be 
deterred from eating sugary foods because they misjudge the hedonic ben-
efits (especially, the long-term harms), they would prefer not to consume 
that food if they fully understood its effects, or they should exercise more 
self-discipline by avoiding empty pleasures. The complexity of these de-
bates, and the long history of substantial public efforts to curtail these types 
of behavior, suggests that the unrestricted preferences view is far too sim-
ple. 
NLE is based on a bet that actual preferences are closely enough cor-
related with actual well-being (however understood) that the methodology 
is sufficiently accurate in general conditions, or at least in certain identifi-
able settings. To be sure, this bet may be a good one: we might think, for 
example, that the preferences of (at least) sophisticated persons will ap-
proximate their undistorted preferences, or the objectively correct prefer-
ences, whatever they might be; and that satisfaction of these preferences 
will bring about happiness as well. The market system is based on the same 
bet, and NLE is powerful because it draws on the credibility of the market 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 5. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 147-48 (1999); MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE 284-91 (2006); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL 
RIGHTS (2d ed. 2011); James Griffin, Welfare Rights, 4 J. ETHICS 27 (2000). 
 6. For a discussion, see Chris Heathwood, Desire-Fulfillment Theory, in THE 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF WELL-BEING 135 (Guy Fletcher ed., 2016). 
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system. That is why NLE generally assumes that state intervention is 
proper only if there is a “market failure.” But the market may have less 
credibility these days than it used to have. If we thought that the market 
normally produces outcomes that do not advance well-being, we would be 
as concerned as much about market success as market failure. 
B. Distribution 
As noted earlier, most welfarists believe that, all else equal, wealth 
differences should be minimized because of the diminishing marginal util-
ity of money. Thus, distributive justice can be seen as an implication of 
welfarism rather than an independent moral goal. In the public finance lit-
erature, it is standard to begin with welfarist premises, and assume that the 
goal of policy is to balance the benefits for welfare of redistributing wealth 
to the poor and the efficiency (and hence welfare) costs of doing so, typi-
cally understood as resulting from the weakening of incentives to work.7 
Non-welfarists also frequently believe in distributive justice—that wealth 
differences should not be too great as a matter of morality and public pol-
icy. For present purposes, I abstract away from the question whether dis-
tributive justice is best understood in welfarist or non-welfarist terms. 
Economists in the welfare economics tradition have long struggled 
with the problem of distribution. As noted above, the efficiency criteria not 
only disregard distributive effects, but in fact block relatively uncontrover-
sial redistributive projects. The story is long and complicated, but eventu-
ally two approaches became common. First, mainly outside the public fi-
nance literature, economists tend to make normative proposals based on 
Kaldor-Hicks (or sometimes Pareto) efficiency while explicitly leaving 
open distributive issues. In one common formulation, the normative econ-
omist is an “advisor” who proposes efficient projects to the “policymaker” 
but acknowledges that the policymaker may choose to reject the projects 
because of adverse distributional effects that lie outside the expertise of 
the economist.8 The other approach, which has become dominant in public 
finance but remains controversial, is to stipulate a social welfare function 
(or a class of social welfare functions) with relatively appealing distribu-
tional properties (that is, that treats everyone as equal and builds in quasi-
egalitarian assumptions). The policy proposals that emerge from this ap-
proach reflect a compromise between efficiency costs and distributional 
costs, both understood in welfarist terms.9 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 7. See Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Labor Income Taxation, in 5 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 391 (Alan J. Auerbach et al. eds., 2013). 
 8. The debate is described in ADLER & POSNER, supra note 2. For a recent contribution 
from within economics, see Stephen Coate, An Efficiency Approach to the Evaluation of Policy 
Changes, 100 ECON. J. 437 (2000). 
 9. Piketty & Saez, supra note 7. As the authors discuss, some models also incorporate 
non-welfarist moral assumptions. 
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Most NLE scholarship makes a stronger claim: that the policymaker 
should herself disregard the distributive consequences of a project and (in 
effect) go ahead and implement the efficient project proposed by the advi-
sor because distribution will be taken care of by the tax-and-transfer sys-
tem. More formally, “legal rules” (technically, rules that affect incentives 
to take care, invest, rely, and engage in other actions beyond the choice 
whether to work or consume leisure) should maximize “efficiency” (and, 
in the typical case, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion) while redistribution should 
be accomplished through the tax and transfer system (that is, rules that 
solely affect the choice between work and leisure and generate revenue 
that fund public projects or is distributed to the public). The argument, in 
a nutshell, is that under reasonably general conditions10 a liability rule that 
redistributes wealth to the poor will distort both the incentive to work and 
the incentive to avoid harm, while an efficient legal rule joined with taxes-
and-transfers will distort only the incentive to work. This argument origi-
nated in the 1970s with Hylland and Zeckhauser,11 and has been most vig-
orously advanced, as well as refined and expanded, by Kaplow and 
Shavell.12  
The significance of the argument is that it shows how economists can 
contribute to public policy even though they (by concession) have nothing 
to offer to distributive questions. An institutional division-of-labor is as-
serted, with economists occupying the role of efficiency experts, and others 
(policymakers?, voters?, moral philosophers?) offering advice or making 
judgments about distribution. This approach provides a defense of NLE 
against those people who, on welfarist or non-welfarist grounds, believe 
that government policy should help the poor. 
As Kaplow and Shavell acknowledge, the argument is not based on 
the Pareto principle. If we are evaluating a single project, it is highly un-
likely that the tax system will redistribute the gains from that project’s win-
ners to the losers. Thus, there is no claim that the tax system ensures that 
a non-Pareto project evaluated in isolation has an overall Pareto-superior 
impact. The way to think about this approach is to imagine that an equilib-
rium distribution of wealth is enforced by the incumbent tax-and-transfer 
system as more or less fixed, and ask whether an efficient project advances 
welfare. It might, of course—either because its distributive effects are fa-
vorable (independent of, or thanks to, taxation of wealthy beneficiaries). 
But it might not—if the distributive effects are sufficiently harmful despite 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 10. How general they are is contested. See Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal 
Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000). 
 11. Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional Objectives Should Affect 
Taxes but Not Program Choice or Design, 81 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 264 (1979). 
 12. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994). For a lucid restatement, see 
David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
439 (2003). 
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the hypothesized reverse pressure of the tax-and-transfer system. Or: a re-
distributive project outside of the tax-and-transfer system may advance 
welfare (by shifting money from rich to poor despite the efficiency cost) or 
it may not (because the efficiency cost is so large, or because a legislature 
reverses the project in order to maintain the status quo distribution of 
wealth).13 Moreover, a legal rule that redistributes could be justified on 
welfarist grounds despite its inefficiency because the incumbent tax-and-
transfer system is even more inefficient in its design or operation—it con-
sumes enormous resources to move a dollar from person A to person B. 
For a timely example, consider the possibility that firms will develop 
a COVID-19 vaccine or cure, and will sell doses only to the highest bidders. 
Put aside externality-related questions, and assume that the government 
considers a project that would ration the doses or cures. From a welfarist 
standpoint, it seems plausible that the poor—who live in more crowded 
conditions, have worse access to medical care, and more frequently suffer 
from comorbidities than wealthy people do—would benefit more from the 
product than the wealthy would. But the wealthy will outbid the poor, so 
the rationing project would fail the test of efficiency. Kaplow and Shavell’s 
framework implies that we should oppose the rationing project, period. We 
should instead advocate market allocation. 
One way to see why is to recognize that the poor would want to sell 
their doses back to the wealthy and take their chances with illness and 
death. So why should the government give the doses to the poor in the first 
place? The only response is that this is an odd but perhaps defensible way 
to redistribute wealth to the poor. The onset of the pandemic was also an 
economic shock that harmed lower-income workers—many of them essen-
tial workers who exposed themselves to considerable risk—much more se-
verely than wealthier people. Distributing vaccines by lottery or favoring 
poorer people—rather than allocating them via the market—may seem fair 
under the circumstances, and perhaps more politically feasible than taxes 
and transfers because that sense of fairness may be broadly shared. That 
would be a sufficient reason for preferring a lottery or rationing system to 
a more efficient alternative.14 
And yet it also true that a project for distributing a vaccine or cure 
should reflect efficiency considerations. Imagine that a project for distrib-
uting a vaccine in a distributively just way is more expensive than an alter-
native feasible project that would distribute the vaccine to the same people. 
The only basis for rejecting the initial project is efficiency—and that seems 
like a good basis for rejecting it. 
Call this argument the “division-of-labor” justification for NLE. NLE 
identifies the efficiency costs of potential projects but no more. The overall 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 13. See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and 
Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (2016). 
 14. As pointed out by Coate, supra note 8, in the more general context; and Fennell & 
McAdams, supra note 13, with respect to the Kaplow/Shavell view. 
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moral value of the project approved on efficiency grounds remains uncer-
tain until distributional analysis is completed. Kaplow and Shavell too hast-
ily dismiss the possibility that inefficient legal rules that redistribute may 
be justified as the only feasible way to enhance welfare. But a role for NLE 
remains intact. The NLE analyst, like one of Adam Smith’s pin workers, 
tinkers with some of the features of a proposed project or mechanism, then 
sends it down the assembly line where others bring to bear their expertise. 
The finished product will reflect a range of judgments. 
C. Non-Welfare Moral Norms 
NLE has frequently been criticized by legal scholars and moral phi-
losophers who either reject welfarism, or believe that non-welfarist moral 
principles and welfarism should jointly determine public policy. NLE has, 
for the most part, ignored these criticisms, but three justifications for dis-
regarding (or, as we will see, minimizing) non-welfarist principles can be 
identified. 
1. Non-welfarist moral principles are wrong; welfarism comprehen-
sively accounts for the proper moral objectives of policymakers. 
2. Non-welfarist moral principles may be valid but only because they 
are ultimately derived from welfarist premises. 
3. Non-welfarist principles may be reflected in people’s preferences, 
but the principles should not guide policy except to the extent that people 
with non-welfarist preferences are willing to pay to override policy based 
on efficiency. 
To understand these distinctions, consider the widely-held moral in-
tuition that people should be forbidden to sell their own body parts, includ-
ing kidneys. The law in the United States and virtually every other country 
enforces this norm. Some economists have argued that sales of kidneys 
should be lawful.15 Many people suffer and die because of kidney failure; 
if these people were allowed to purchase kidneys from healthy people for 
a price that those healthy people were willing to accept, welfare would in-
crease. And because healthy people have two kidneys, they can spare one 
of them without suffering significant adverse health effects—as has been 
demonstrated by the willingness of people to make uncompensated dona-
tions of a kidney, usually to relatives. 
People’s “fairness” intuitions are often very powerful, and they fre-
quently contradict the results of economic analysis based on welfarism.16 It 
is easy, using welfarist principles and simple behavioral models, to believe 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 15. Gary S. Becker & Julio Jorge Elías, Introducing Incentives in the Market for Live 
and Cadaveric Organ Donations, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2007). 
 16. An influential strand of social choice theory devoted itself to showing that non-wel-
farist values (e.g., opposition to dictatorship, commitment to personal autonomy) cannot be rec-
onciled with Pareto efficiency, so that social welfare functions that included both resulted in par-
adoxes. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); 
Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1970). 
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that tort victims should not be paid compensation by wrongdoers (because 
private insurance is more efficient than state-mandated payments); that 
punishments for serious crimes should be less severe than punishments for 
less serious crimes (where the less serious crimes are harder to detect); that 
fraud should not be punished under certain conditions (where it enables a 
person to obtain a return on a socially valuable investment); and that all 
kinds of contracts that people regard as morally objectionable—sales of 
body parts, sales of oneself into slavery, prostitution, drug deals, and so 
on—should be permitted. There are many more examples where “fairness” 
intuitions are subtler and more open to debate, including whether sellers 
should be allowed to overcharge unsophisticated buyers, how free people 
should be to choose their contracting partners, and (to use a recent exam-
ple) whether people should be allowed to raise prices for necessary items 
during an emergency, such as a pandemic. In these cases, norms about 
treating people fairly may conflict with market norms that protect invest-
ment and celebrate free choice. While welfarists may believe that market 
norms should prevail, ordinary people do not always agree—and the law 
seems to embody compromises rather than permit one set of norms to pre-
vail consistently. 
Moral repugnance toward the sale of kidneys persists despite cogent 
arguments from economists that the ban results in needless suffering and 
death. That leaves three responses for the committed welfarist. First, one 
can argue that the norm is morally wrong just because it violates welfarism. 
This is a philosophical argument about the merits of welfarism, one that 
remains unresolved after hundreds of years of debate. Second, one can 
“welfarize” the norm by arguing that, despite appearances, it advances wel-
fare. A common version of this argument is that if people were allowed to 
sell their kidneys, many poor people would do so against their own inter-
est.17 Note that this argument leaves open a possible efficiency-based re-
sponse—for example, that kidney sales should be permitted after the seller 
receives counseling or that they should be permitted if the seller is not 
poor. Third, one can treat the allegedly moral norm against selling of body 
parts as merely a preference for a certain type of outcome—the absence of 
kidney sales. If people are willing to pay to block kidney sales, then kidney 
sales do reduce welfare—not necessarily of the seller, but of third parties—
and so the question is one of accounting the costs and benefits on both 
sides. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 17. DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS 
OF MARKETS (2010). Welfarizing arguments are common in law and economics. One strand of 
literature argues that social norms that many people regard as morally compelling are efficient or 
welfare-enhancing. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). For criticisms, see ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000). 
In other areas of law, scholars often argue that “moral” norms advance efficiency. 
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In a 2002 book entitled Fairness Versus Welfare,18 Kaplow and 
Shavell make the first and third arguments (and possibly the second as 
well). Drawing on the social welfare function tradition in welfare econom-
ics, Kaplow and Shavell argue that policymakers should attempt to max-
imize a social welfare function and, to do so, they should choose Kaldor-
Hicks-efficient policies.  
Kaplow and Shavell’s defense of their position is a demonstration that 
polices based on welfare generate more welfare than policies based on 
non-welfarist moral principles (what they call “fairness” principles)—a 
tautological exercise, as they acknowledge. Perhaps the justification for 
this strategy is that it makes clear how, in an enormous range of legal con-
texts, a consistent refusal to bend to welfarist considerations could, in ag-
gregate, generate enormous losses for society. Kaplow and Shavell seem to 
think that once people are exposed to these potential losses, they will aban-
don their non-welfarist moral commitments. But philosophers have under-
stood this tradeoff for hundreds of years, and ordinary people seem to as 
well. Consider the taboo on the sale of kidneys and other human organs. 
People who defend that taboo are aware that it blocks welfare-enhancing 
transfers.19 
In fact, Kaplow and Shavell do not exactly argue, despite their rejec-
tion of “fairness” principles, that those principles should be disregarded. 
They argue instead that preferences for fair outcomes should be incorpo-
rated into the social welfare function—the third approach described above. 
Moral commitments become preferences—they have the same methodo-
logical status and hence moral weight as preferences for the consumption 
of goods and services. If people are willing to pay enough to block decep-
tion, torture, or invidious discrimination, then the state will honor those 
preferences even if otherwise those practices advanced welfare. 
This style of welfarizing non-welfarist principles is actually a rejection 
of them. People on both sides of the abortion debate agree that the right-
ness or wrongness of abortion does not depend on aggregate willingness-
to-pay. Moreover, Kaplow and Shavell do not try very hard to show that a 
policymaker can elicit valuations about people’s moral objections to policy 
reforms under consideration. There is a long history of skepticism among 
economists about this type of exercise,20 and there are complex conceptual, 
as well as methodological, issues because people will often state very 
strongly their support for a general moral principle but then under further 
questioning disclose (or realize, as a result of argument and introspection) 
that their moral judgments depend on context. Accordingly, even if 
Kaplow and Shavell are right that non-welfarist principles should be 
treated like consumption goods, policymakers might do better by relying 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 18. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002); see also 
LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS (2008). 
 19. See, e.g., SATZ, supra note 17.  
 20. See CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (J.A. Hausman ed., 1993). 
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on their own moral intuitions—or engaging in moral debate with their col-
leagues and members of the public, so as to refine and strengthen those 
intuitions—and incorporating those moral principles into the policies they 
implement. That approach may work better than trying to elicit the public’s 
willingness to pay. 
A vivid illustration of this point is Alvin Roth’s celebrated work on 
kidney exchanges.21 Suppose a person would be willing to donate a kidney 
to a relative or friend but lacks a compatible immune system. Under Roth’s 
approach, other non-matching donor/donee pairs are identified, so that 
each donor can donate to an immune-compatible stranger while ensuring 
that the desired donee obtains an immune-compatible kidney as well. A 
person cannot sell her kidney for money, but she can barter her kidney for 
a promise from someone else to alienate his kidney to a person selected by 
a donor. Elaborate chains are constructed, often involving dozens of peo-
ple. The chains are complicated and fragile—the entire chain collapses if 
one donor withdraws—and certainly less efficient than a regulated market 
for kidneys would be. Yet because moral prohibitions on the sale of human 
organs block the sale of kidneys for a price, the less efficient non-price 
market is used. In other work, Roth proposes a theory of “repugnant trans-
actions” that, he argues, economists should treat as constraints when they 
make normative proposals. While some of these taboos probably can be 
defended on welfarist grounds (e.g., bribes and kickbacks), others more 
likely reflect Kantian values (e.g., prohibitions on dwarf-tossing and other 
demeaning activities, on indentured servitude and other forms of voluntary 
slavery, on transactions that discriminate against various groups, and so 
on). 
All of this suggests that NLE proposals will be most successful—most 
persuasive to the most people, and most likely to be implemented—in do-
mains of policy where the non-welfarist principles happen to be weak. Al-
ternatively, NLE scholars may be able to obtain broader acceptance for 
their proposals by incorporating non-welfarist principles directly into the 
analysis. There is some NLE scholarship, for example, that attempts to 
show that legal rules or reforms comply with non-welfarist legal norms as 
well as efficiency criteria.22 But this kind of effort seems to be in its infancy. 
D. Behavior 
Welfarist-inspired moral philosophy (for example, the work of Peter 
Singer) is not the same as NLE: what is distinctive about NLE is that it 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 21. See Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, Efficient Kidney Exchange: 
Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 828 
(2007). 
 22. See, e.g., Ariel Porat, The Many Faces of Negligence, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
105 (2003). 
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joins welfarist normative premises with the behavioral premises of eco-
nomics. Much of the skepticism about NLE is derived from skepticism 
about the underlying behavioral premises: that people respond to incen-
tives as consistently as assumed by economic theory, and at the level of 
precision that economic theory implies. 
Consider, for example, the analysis of self-reporting in Kaplow and 
Shavell’s Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior.23 
The paper addresses the questions of whether and how wrongdoers should 
be encouraged to report their wrongdoing to the government. The problem 
arises outside the standard tort setting where the victim knows that she has 
been injured by a wrongdoer, and reports that wrongdoing to the govern-
ment (the police, or a court via a lawsuit) to obtain protection or collect 
damages. When victims do not know the identity of the wrongdoer, or do 
not know they have been harmed, the government must conduct an “au-
dit,” that is, monitor the behavior of potential wrongdoers. Governments 
audit taxpayers, banks, factories, and many other people and entities, but 
auditing is costly. It would be better if the wrongdoers could be induced to 
self-report. 
Kaplow and Shavell construct a model in which a single agent may 
take an action that harms another agent. The government incurs a cost to 
audit possible wrongdoers, and by incurring a higher cost, may increase the 
probability of catching a wrongdoer. If a wrongdoer is caught, a sanction is 
imposed, which is assumed to be the wrongdoer’s entire wealth. With no 
self-reporting mechanism, the government should choose an audit rate that 
rises with the harm and falls with the enforcement cost. With a self-report-
ing mechanism, the government can reduce enforcement costs without re-
ducing deterrence. The maximal sanction will be imposed on anyone who 
fails to self-report and then is subsequently audited (which deters people 
from failing to self-report) and a sanction equal to the audit probability 
times the maximal sanction is imposed on anyone who commits the wrong-
doing and reports it (which deters people from committing the wrong). 
The paper makes an elegant argument but its major analytic contri-
bution depends heavily on the behavioral assumptions being right. Some-
times, they will be. Managers of corporations from time to time discover 
that employees have committed crimes for which the corporation will be 
punished if the crimes are discovered. The corporation decides whether to 
report those crimes to the government or to conceal them. A self-reporting 
mechanism may well give the corporation the optimal incentive both to 
disclose criminal activity of employees and to discourage that activity in 
the first place. Corporations have the institutional capacity for understand-
ing the legal regime and estimating the payoffs from complying with it. 
(And also for gaming it—but that is another story.) 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 23. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting Be-
havior, 102 J. POL. ECON. 583 (1994). 
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But will a self-reporting mechanism work in the same way for ordinary 
people—for example, taxpayers who must decide whether to report to the 
government errors (or deliberate tax violations) that they committed in the 
past? Or for plea bargaining, which is another version of the self-reporting 
mechanism? It is hard to say. NLE makes strong assumptions that people 
are responsive to incentives. But evidence is mixed as to how well people 
respond to incentives, and we do not know whether (for example) the self-
reporting mechanisms will work well or poorly in the tax or plea bargaining 
settings. Indeed, there is limited evidence that people respond predictably 
to the threat of criminal sanctions, and none at all (as far as I know) that 
they appropriately calculate the risks and benefits when confronted with a 
plea offer. NLE incorporates a bet: the bet that people are sufficiently re-
sponsive to incentives, so that the sometimes complicated mechanisms pro-
posed by NLE scholars aren’t lost in noise.24 
Lurking in the background is the broader question of the stability of 
preferences. Economic theory assumes that preferences for goods, ser-
vices, and outcomes remain stable for the duration of the period of analy-
sis. That assumption is reasonable in a range of conditions; for example, if 
one seeks to predict the impact of a commodity tax on the price of toma-
toes. The assumptions become more questionable as one broadens the in-
quiry.25 Tastes do change, often in unpredictable ways. If one follows 
Kaplow and Shavell and treats non-welfarist moral principles as “tastes,” 
one can see why the NLE approach discomfits so many people. Attitudes 
toward sexual minorities, for example, have undergone a revolutionary 
change over the last several decades in the United States. Standard eco-
nomic theory would treat a policy proposal to benefit sexual minorities (for 
example, recognition of same-sex marriage) as simply a transfer of re-
sources from one group of people to another group of people, while most 
people involved in the debate saw it as a way of changing attitudes (that is, 
“preferences”). People rarely argue seriously about consumption tastes 
(whether one should like chocolate ice cream or not) but argue all the time 
about moral “tastes” (whether abortion is wrong or not), and they do so 
with the expectation that they can change minds. A method that rules out 
this expectation needs a stronger justification than has been offered. 
NLE’s traditional behavior assumptions—that people are adept at in-
strumental rationality—have been challenged over the last few decades by 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 24. Kaplow (along with Scott Duke Kominers) made just such an argument against a 
mechanism I proposed with Glen Weyl in ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL 
MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY (2020). See Louis 
Kaplow & Scott Duke Kominers, Who Will Vote Quadratically? Voter Turnout and Votes Cast 
Under Quadratic Voting, 172 PUB. CHOICE 125 (2017). 
 25. Becker and Stigler attempted to evade this limitation by assuming that people’s pref-
erences were largely similar and indefinitely stable, so apparent changes in preferences were really 
due to changes in budget constraints, opportunities, and the like. George J. Stigler & Gary J. 
Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76 (1977). Their argument has 
been met with considerable skepticism. See, e.g., Tyler Cowen, Are All Tastes Constant and Iden-
tical?: A Critique of Stigler and Becker, 11 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 127 (1989). 
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behavioral economists, who argue that people are boundedly rational. It is 
widely understood that behavioral economics challenges the predictions 
that are generated from rational-choice models. But behavioral economics 
also challenges normative economics and NLE by suggesting that, even if 
their welfarist principles are correct, reforms that enhance efficiency based 
on traditional economic models could instead generate perverse outcomes 
as people react unpredictably to those reforms. 
II. Implications 
A. NLE in General: Modularity and Mid-Level Abstraction 
The conditions in which NLE may usefully operate may seem so strin-
gent that some readers might think that the scope of NLE is nil. But that 
view is too pessimistic for reasons I have already suggested—that NLE 
plays a useful role in a larger policy-analysis division-of-labor.  
Consider again Kaplow and Shavell’s analysis of the self-reporting 
mechanism. One can appreciate the paper’s insights without worrying too 
much about evaluative criteria, or even (within limits) philosophical issues. 
At the level of abstraction at which the argument proceeds, even a Kantian 
will agree that the government should not waste enforcement resources. 
However, because the argument is presented at an abstract level, difficult 
moral and political questions surrounding real-world implementation are 
avoided, not resolved. There are, for example, serious moral concerns 
about imposing a “maximal sanction” (all of someone’s wealth) or a very 
large sanction for failing to self-report a tax violation, say. It also may be 
regarded as unfair if a self-reporting regime is used in some settings but not 
in others—for example, if, in practice, wealthy or connected people are 
more likely to take advantage of it than other people are. Plea-bargaining 
may be condemned for causing humiliation or praised for inciting self-re-
flection—neither of which value plays a role in a standard welfare analysis. 
So we can see both an advantage and a cost to Kaplow and Shavell’s 
method. The results for self-reporting regimes can be applied in a wide 
range of contexts (criminal law, tax law, tort law, and the internal organi-
zation of institutions like employers and government agencies), and any 
good analyst should be prepared to use their ideas if a policymaker seeks 
to implement a new audit regime. In this sense, the analysis has a modular 
feel—the modular nature of the insight comes from its abstraction from 
real-world settings, and that is what gives the insight its power. But when 
it comes time to apply it, and moral and political questions come to the 
fore—this is when the insights of economic analysis begin to be overtaken 
and eventually drowned out by philosophical, political, or practical con-
cerns. 
Another way to think of the contribution is as “mid-level” rather than 
modular. Mid-level refers to the degree of abstraction—to the extent the 
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winners and losers of a policy are identified. At the lowest level, consider 
projects implemented by regulatory agencies. When the EPA considers an 
environmental regulation, it identifies the winners in terms of demographic 
categories (e.g., people who live near a water source, or pregnant women, 
or small children, or people with asthma), and losers (usually, consumers 
who must pay higher prices). It then conducts a cost-benefit analysis. Be-
cause the winners and losers are identified, the distributional effects of the 
regulation can be estimated, and other non-welfarist concerns may become 
visible (e.g., the distributional impact on racial groups, which may raise 
concerns about equality or coercion). These low-level projects are inher-
ently controversial, and may require (as I argue below) complex moral 
evaluations. 
On the other hand, high-level projects involve reforms of basic insti-
tutional commitments. Is the market good or bad? Should we favor the 
state system or strive for world government or open our borders? Should 
immigrants be encouraged to assimilate or retain their cultural identities? 
These questions, while highly abstract, are extremely controversial be-
cause the answers could affect millions of people. 
NLE scholarship (as well as related work by economists in economics 
journals26) is most successful when it addresses mid-level projects. Not just 
self-reporting, but also other modular policy tools that are used in many 
different contexts: rules versus standards, government enforcement versus 
private enforcement, individual actions versus class actions, liability rules 
versus property rules, and so on. The questions that arise are often instru-
mental in nature, and moral intuitions and philosophy typically have little 
to say about them. Ironically, at the lower level of abstraction at which 
NLE begins to run into problems, one finds disputes over substantive legal 
rules: strict liability versus negligence, expectations damages versus spe-
cific performance, the death penalty, gun control, liability for invidious dis-
crimination. Here, where non-welfarist intuitions intrude, economics can 
still make claims about the welfare effects of different possible approaches, 
but economics as such has nothing to offer beyond that. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 26. Economists tend to avoid, or say that they avoid, normative pronouncements in their 
scholarship. The taboo against normative arguments can be found in the NBER bylaws, which 
forbids the publication of papers under NBER’s auspices if they make policy arguments. Many 
economists will also tell you that they do not, or should not, make policy arguments in academic 
journals. However, there are fairly common exceptions. In public finance, economists often use a 
social welfare function that incorporates distributional weights; this is especially common in the 
tax literature. See Piketty & Saez, supra note 7. Outside public finance, economists often publish 
articles that identify an externality and address (usually superficially) how it might be corrected 
through policy. One also finds empirical papers in other areas, for example, the economics of 
crime, that analyze policies and criticize them because of their effects on public values, for exam-
ple, the avoidance of racially discriminatory outcomes. See, e.g., Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, 
Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Racial Discrimination: A Field Experiment, 133 Q.J. ECON. 
191 (2018). Finally, the literature on mechanism design makes policy proposals, usually based on 
efficiency but sometimes subject to moral constraints. See, e.g., Roth et al., supra note 21. All of 
this work is at least partly abstracted from real-world conditions. 
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B. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
One of the most significant areas of policy in which the division-of-
labor justification operates is in the area of administrative regulation. In 
the United States, many regulatory agencies use cost-benefit analysis to 
evaluate regulations and other projects. Agencies do not incorporate dis-
tributional weight into their cost-benefit analyses. While they occasionally 
address broader moral issues, only cost-benefit analysis is used systemati-
cally, as required by a series of executive orders. 
The best defense of this practice is that agencies operate within a 
broader institutional structure that assigns distribution and controversial 
moral questions to a politically responsive body (Congress) and delegates 
“technical” functions to quasi-autonomous bodies (agencies). Distribution 
is not delegated to a single “distribution agency” or to the existing group 
of specialized agencies because distribution is politically controversial. Nor 
are non-welfarist moral questions. But there are many settings in which 
Congress is able to establish a general goal (a cleaner environment, a stable 
money supply, safe workplaces) and vest in agencies a relatively technical 
function of achieving that goal at least cost. The social consensus that leads 
to the legislation may carry through and support agency action that stays 
within the scope of the legislation. Cost-benefit analysis is the vehicle for 
accomplishing this task. 
The basis of the argument is not the double-distortion argument of 
Kaplow and Shavell, but the allocation of expertise and political legiti-
macy.27 EPA is required to comply with cost-benefit analysis but that does 
not mean it should abandon environmental projects and start regulating 
workplace safety if it determines that workplace externalities are far 
greater than environmental externalities. EPA is not an efficiency agency; 
it is an environmental agency. And EPA should not normally take into ac-
count distributional considerations because, if it does, it might lose the con-
fidence of Congress and possibly the public. Moreover, if all agencies take 
into account distributional effects, but make different distributional judg-
ments, they might end up undermining each other’s distributional goals. In 
the administrative setting, Congress may reasonably seek to give technical 
authority to agencies but not the power to redistribute wealth—both be-
cause agency officials lack the political legitimacy and expertise, and be-
cause they might act inconsistently with each other. 
That said, it would be a mistake for agencies to disregard distribu-
tional and non-welfarist moral considerations altogether. There are two 
reasons. First, certain major agency actions could have a significant unfa-
vorable distributional impact that will not realistically be corrected by Con-
gress even in part. Because agencies do not have the power to tax and 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 27. But see Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Other Half of Regulatory Theory, 52 
CONN. L. REV. 605 (2020) (envisioning a more expansive role for agencies). 
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transfer, the preferred alternative—efficient regulation plus transfer—is 
not feasible (unless one can reliably ask Congress for help). There remains 
a problem of coordination; ideally, agencies would be given guidance so 
that they do not act at cross purposes. The Clinton and Obama administra-
tions instructed agencies to take into account the effects of their regula-
tions on equity, but these instructions were vague and had no discernable 
impact.  
Second, agencies need to be cautious about using economic tools that 
may violate moral principles. An important example is the use of a con-
stant value of a statistical life (VSL) rather than a VSL that varies with 
actual willingness to pay, which would imply lower VSLs for poorer (and 
possibly older) people. In markets, wealthier people are free to purchase 
higher-quality safety equipment and medical care than other people can 
afford, and the logic of efficiency would compel that the government re-
quire, through regulation, that industry offer greater health and safety ben-
efits to wealthier people than to poorer people. It is not clear that there is 
a defensible moral principle that allows unequal health outcomes in the 
market but prohibits them when the government “completes” the market 
through health and safety regulation, but such a principle is likely neces-
sary to maintain the legitimacy of, and public support for, agency action. 
C. Futility Argments 
Another area in which NLE can be useful is in the generation of what 
I will call “futility arguments.” A futility argument is an argument that a 
project will simply not achieve its goal, and will probably generate some 
cost as well. Futility arguments are powerful because they do not depend 
on any normative assumption (with an exception discussed below). Utili-
tarians, Kantians, Christian Scientists, Maoists, and virtue-ethicists should 
all agree that a policymaker should not implement a project that produces 
no effect except waste. But futility arguments come with a price: heavy re-
liance on the behavioral conditions of NLE, which do all the work in futility 
analysis. They need to be accurate for the problem at hand. And those con-
ditions can be very strong. 
Futility arguments are familiar and come in many flavors. One futility 
argument is that a minimum wage (above a certain level) produces no ben-
efit because employers will fire their workers and shut down business ra-
ther than raise their wages. If the goal of the minimum wage law is to en-
hance the well-being of workers, the law is, on this view, futile. The so-
called Laffer curve makes a similar argument: a tax rate above a certain 
level will produce less revenue than a lower tax rate because people will 
stop working and earning income. Futile projects fail all the welfarist cri-
teria I have discussed; but as I said, they also fail evaluative criteria outside 
economics. 
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The exception is that certain religions and moral systems do allow for 
casuistry (understood in the non-pejorative sense). Consider, for example, 
a project that bans interest on all loans—a project that was in force 
throughout much of history in Christian countries, and continues to be in 
force in Muslim countries. This project could be regarded as futile, at least 
for certain types of credit transactions, because it is relatively easy to con-
struct economically identical transactions (for example, by selling and leas-
ing back property at rental rates that incorporate an implicit interest pay-
ment).28 If the goal of restrictions on interest rate is to prevent loans at 
interest, then these restrictions are futile. However, in these religious and 
moral systems, where formal types of behavior are prohibited but func-
tional equivalents are allowed, futility arguments may not be persuasive. 
Casuistic projects lie outside mainstream policy analysis in the United 
States, which is—to the contrary—obsessed with blocking such evasions, 
also known as regulatory arbitrage. Economists and NLE scholars have 
been at the forefront in developing futility arguments even though, as I 
have explained, futility arguments do not depend on welfarism or any other 
normative systems associated with economics. The contribution of eco-
nomic analysis is the identification of the behavioral response to a pro-
posed project, implying (though this hardly requires sophisticated eco-
nomic technique) that the response is inconsistent with the stated goal of 
the project. As I said, these arguments are common. Giving food stamps to 
poor people so as to improve their health is futile if they trade them away 
on the black market for drugs. Integrating schools or neighborhoods with 
legal rules or subsidies is futile if white people move away. Gun control for 
crime prevention is futile if people use guns to defend themselves rather 
than kill others. And so on. 
Futility arguments are valuable when they are successful because they 
tell policymakers that some superficially attractive projects should be ruled 
out. The arguments do not tell policymakers what to do instead, but we 
should not be contemptuous of arguments that help policymakers avoid 
errors. Unfortunately, futility arguments have a long history of abuse.29 
The most famous and most frequently abused futility argument (or 
class of futility arguments) is the Coase theorem. One version of the Coase 
theorem—a contrivance of George Stigler, based on Coase’s paper, The 
Problem of Social Cost,30 which offers some insightful criticisms of Pigou-
vian taxes—says that legal rules do not affect outcomes if people can trade 
their entitlements at low or zero cost. A less ambitious version says that 
legal rules can change outcomes, including the distribution of wealth, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 28. See, e.g., HARRIS IRFAN, HEAVEN’S BANKERS: INSIDE THE HIDDEN WORLD OF 
ISLAMIC FINANCE (2015). 
 29. As recounted in ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: 
PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY (1991). 
 30. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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cannot push outcomes away from efficiency if people can trade their enti-
tlements at low or zero cost. The first version says that if transaction costs 
are low, all legal interventions are futile; the second version says that all 
legal interventions that seek to improve efficiency are futile. 
In one of Coase’s well-known examples, sparks from a railroad cause 
fires on land abutting the railroad tracks. Coase argues that a naïve Pigou-
vian response to this problem would require the railroad to pay damages 
to the landowners. However, it is possible that the land next to the tracks 
is worth more if used to absorb sparks rather than grow crops. If so, then 
the railroad will buy back the right to emit sparks on the land, returning us 
to the status quo. The “legal rule” that imposes Pigouvian taxes on the rail-
road—interpreted as shifting the right to use the abutting land from rail-
road to landowners—does not affect behavior.31 It may affect distribution, 
but not necessarily in a desirable way (since the landowners may be wealth-
ier than the railroad shareholders). 
I say that the Coase futility argument has been abused because the 
conditions in which it operates are unlikely to occur in the real world. Bar-
gaining—even two-person bargaining—is always costly. And if transac-
tions and/or information costs were ever zero or close to it, then markets 
are unnecessary; the government can simply allocate resources to their 
most efficient owners via planning.32 However, other futility arguments, 
within more specific domains, can carry the day. 
D. A Note on the Differences Between Moral and Political Constraints 
I have so far lumped together several different kinds of norms: (non-
welfarist) moral, social, and political. All of these norms constrain policy 
that might otherwise be based entirely on welfarism, but they constrain it 
in different ways, and these differences may be important for policymak-
ers. I will here briefly discuss the difference between a moral and social 
norm, and leave political norms for another time. 
A moral norm—and, again, I am focusing on non-welfarist moral 
norms—is relevant to the normative value of a project but not necessarily 
its feasibility. Roth’s kidney exchange system may be good—better than a 
market in kidneys—because it does not violate a norm against the sale of 
body parts while otherwise advancing welfare. The policymaker who seeks 
to implement good policies may therefore rely on Roth’s proposal. But if 
the public does not care about good or bad, and the policymaker prefers to 
implement a policy that has political support, she may disregard Roth’s 
proposal. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 31. In fact, real Pigouvian taxes (damages) obviously would not affect behavior. The rail-
road would simply pay the taxes and continue causing fires. The more surprising implication of 
the Coase theorem is that a legal rule that prohibited rather than merely taxed the emission of 
sparks would not affect outcomes because the railroad would buy an entitlement to send sparks 
onto the land. 
 32. Cf. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
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A social norm may not reflect morality but nonetheless constrains be-
havior. A social norm might be sustained because people have a natural 
tendency to conform their behavior to the patterns of behavior of others, 
or because they seek to coordinate their behavior so as to obtain opportu-
nities, or because they hope to preserve a pro-social reputation—there are 
many other possibilities as well.33 Social norms can be evaluated from the 
standpoint of morality; we might, for example, disapprove of racist norms 
that prevail in many communities, or puzzle over norms that limit prices or 
interest rates, or disapprove of norms that require people to practice ap-
parently senseless rituals. 
A policymaker may consider herself bound by social norms because 
she needs political support—but she may also believe that she should try 
to break down these norms because they violate moral principles (welfarist 
or non-welfarist). Roth’s system might be attractive because it avoids a vi-
olation of a social norm against the sale of body parts; but if this social 
norm is morally senseless, a policymaker might try something else. For a 
more familiar example, policymakers have frequently tried to erode racist 
social norms for moral (or political) reasons. Truman’s order desegregat-
ing the army in 1948 is one example, but one could think of the range of 
laws and regulations that forbid racial discrimination and prohibit racial 
integration in the same light. 
The complexity of social and moral norms poses conundrums for pol-
icy analysts and policymakers alike. It is relatively easy to identify social 
norms (though often difficult to determine whether they are robust or frag-
ile), but hard to determine whether they advance moral values or interfere 
with them. Still, there is no way to avoid addressing them, and reform pro-
posals that neglect them will often seem obtuse and unworkable. 
Conclusion 
All NLE proposals rest on four assumptions: that unrestricted prefer-
ences are sufficiently correlated with the morally proper understanding of 
well-being; that the proposal will advance, or not damage, distributive jus-
tice; that relevant non-welfarist norms are either weak or not damaged by 
the proposal; and that the behavioral assumptions of economics are ap-
proximately correct. These assumptions are, I suspect, rarely met for con-
crete proposals that generate identifiable winners or losers. But NLE can 
make progress by respecting the policy-analysis division-of-labor: modular 
proposals can be generated at the mid-level of abstraction and, in many 
cases, incorporated into more comprehensive proposals at the concrete 
level. All of this means that NLE support for specific policies is always 
contingent and dependent on moral and practical claims outside economics 
and welfarism. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 33. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 17; RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE 
POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS (2014); POSNER, supra note 17. 
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The welfarist assumptions of normative economics are, like the as-
sumptions of descriptive economics, simplifications that enable the policy 
analyst to gain tractability at the expense of realism.34 If our normative 
standards are complex, then every judgment becomes an all-things-consid-
ered exercise, one involving introspection, debate, and consensus-building. 
Normative economics has made progress not by proving that our norma-
tive standards are simple but by developing ways to break up (some) moral 
or policy judgments into simpler parts and more complex parts, allowing 
economic analysis to inform (only) the former. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 34. See Zoë Hitzig & E. Glen Weyl, A Crossroads, Not an Island: A Response to Hanoch 
Dagan, 117 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 117 (2019). 
